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The Slovak forest policy arrangement: Post-1989 residues and changes

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Table S1. Literature recherche summarising table

PAA dimension	Theory	Terms	Scientific papers analysed in English ^a , Slovak ^b and German ^c language
Actors	– Relevant actors (Lieferink 2006; Krott et al. 2014; Schusser et al. 2015) – Domestic actors (Singer, Giessen 2017)	A: Relevant domestic actors A1 governmental actors A2 non-governmental actors	<i>N</i> = 5 <i>N</i> = 2 ^a <i>N</i> = 3 ^b Hricová (2012) ^b ; Sarvašová et al. (2015) ^a ; Šálka et al. (2017) ^b ; Brodrechtoová (2019) ^b ; Juerges et al. (2021) ^a Tutka (2000) ^a ; Dobšinská, Šálka (2009) ^b ; Moravčík and Konôpka (2009) ^b ; Sarvašová et al. (2010) ^b ; Kovalčík (2011) ^b ; Moravčík et al. (2012) ^a ; Sarvašová et al. (2013) ^a ; Dobšinská and Sarvašová (2016) ^a ; Výboštok et al. (2018) ^b ; Paluš and Krahulcová (2019) ^a ; Brodrechtoová (2019) ^b ; Sarvašová et al. (2020) ^b ; Juerges et al. (2021) ^a
Interests/ coalitions	– Interest coalitions (Stern et al. 1995; Glück 2000; Hysing, Olsson 2008; Krott 2010; Šálka et al. 2017b)	A: interests coalitions A1 economic A2 environmental A3 social	<i>N</i> = 13 <i>N</i> = 6 ^a <i>N</i> = 7 ^b Šulek (2010) ^a ; Hricová (2012) ^b ; Bouriaud et al. (2013) ^a ; Dobšinská et al. (2015) ^b ; Hricová et al. (2015) ^b ; Luptáková (2015) ^b ; Šálka et al. (2015) ^b ; Teder et al. (2015) ^a ; Balest et al. (2016) ^a ; Šálka et al. (2016) ^a ; Sarvašová et al. (2017) ^b ; Šálka et al. (2017) ^b ; Brescancin et al. (2018) ^a ; Brodrechtoová and Smreček (2018) ^b ; Brodrechtoová (2019) ^b ; Štěrbová and Kovalčík (2020) ^a ; Galan (2021) ^b ; Juerges et al. (2021) ^a ; Wilkes-Allemann (2021) ^a ; Halaj et al. (2022) ^a ; Krykorková et al. (2022) ^a
Power resources	– "Relational power" (Lieferink 2006) – Power resources (Krott et al. 2014)	A: relational power of actors vis-à-vis other actors B: power resources B1 coercion B2 (dis)incentives B3 dominant information	<i>N</i> = 22 <i>N</i> = 11 ^a <i>N</i> = 10 ^b Šulek (2006) ^a ; Dobšinská (2009) ^b ; Dobšinská and Šálka (2009) ^b ; Šulek (2010) ^a ; Sarvašová et al. (2012) ^a ; Dobšinská et al. (2013) ^a ; Sarvašová et al. (2013) ^a ; Jarský et al. (2014) ^a ; Sarvašová et al. (2014) ^a ; Kovalčík et al. (2016) ^b ; Šálka et al. (2016) ^a ; Šálka et al. (2017) ^b ; Brescancin et al. (2018) ^a ; Paluš et al. (2018) ^a ; Dobšinská et al. (2019) ^b ; Sarvašová et al. (2020) ^b ; Makrickiene et al. (2019) ^a ; Dobšinská et al. (2020) ^a ; Bálíková et al. (2021) ^a ; Juerges et al. (2021) ^a ; Paluš et al. (2021) ^a
Formal rules of the game	– Formal hierarchical rules (Krott 2010). – Formal non-hierarchical rules (Shannon, Schmidt 2002; Šálka, Sarvašová 2009; Krott 2010; Böcher, Töller 2012; Maier et al. 2014; Šálka et al. 2017b; Wilkes-Alleman 2021)	A: Hierarchical: A1 influencing internally: hierarchy in the political-administrative system A2 influencing externally – instruments: A21 Regulatory instruments A22 Economic instruments A23 Informational instruments B: Non-hierarchical: Influencing either internally and externally B1 voluntary instruments B2 forest governance mechanisms B21 participation B22 coordination B221 interdepartmental comment procedure B23 professional advising B24 market	<i>N</i> = 21 <i>N</i> = 15 ^a <i>N</i> = 6 ^b Šulek (2006) ^a ; Dobšinská (2009) ^b ; Dobšinská and Šálka (2009) ^b ; Šulek (2010) ^a ; Sarvašová et al. (2012) ^a ; Dobšinská et al. (2013) ^a ; Sarvašová et al. (2013) ^a ; Jarský et al. (2014) ^a ; Sarvašová et al. (2014) ^a ; Kovalčík et al. (2016) ^b ; Šálka et al. (2016) ^a ; Šálka et al. (2017) ^b ; Brescancin et al. (2018) ^a ; Paluš et al. (2018) ^a ; Dobšinská et al. (2019) ^b ; Sarvašová et al. (2020) ^b ; Makrickiene et al. (2019) ^a ; Dobšinská et al. (2020) ^a ; Bálíková et al. (2021) ^a ; Juerges et al. (2021) ^a ; Paluš et al. (2021) ^a

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Table S1. to be continued

PAA dimension	Theory	Terms	Scientific papers analysed in English ^a , Slovak ^b and German ^c language
Informal rules of the game	– Informal rules (Peters 1998; Arts, Leroy 2006; Krott 2010; RPŠS 2019; Thomas, Klimovich 2013)	A: Informal rules within A1 regulatory instruments A2 economic instruments A3 informational instruments B: other informal aspects B1 networks B2 politicisation B3 informal negotiations B4 lobbying	Šálka (2002) ^c ; Dobšinská and Šálka (2009) ^b ; Dobšinská et al. (2013) ^a ; Maier et al. (2014) ^a ; Luptáková (2015) ^b ; Šálka et al. (2016) ^a ; Šálka et al. (2017) ^b ; Brodrechtová (2019) ^b ; Bálíková (2020) ^b ; Bálíková et al. (2021) ^a ; Juerges et al. (2021) ^a ; Bálíková and Šálka (2022) ^a <i>N</i> = 12 <i>N</i> = 6 ^a <i>N</i> = 5 ^b <i>N</i> = 1 ^c
Discourses	– Mass-media discourse (Dryzek 1997; Arts et al. 2010; Šálka et al. 2017 ^b ; Weingart et al. 2000; Webb et al. 2008)	A: medial discourse	Tuček et al. (2015) ^b ; Brodrechtová et al. (2018) ^a ; Kovalčík and Sujová (2018) ^b ; Brodrechtová (2019) ^b ; Dobšinská et al. (2020) ^a ; Sarvašová et al. (2020) ^b ; Dúbravská et al. (2021) ^b ; grey literature <i>N</i> = 7 <i>N</i> = 2 ^a <i>N</i> = 5 ^b

For full references see the manuscript

PAA – Policy Arrangement Approach